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Abstract
This paper examines the role of monetary policy in an environment with aggregate risk and
incomplete markets. In a two-period overlapping-generations model with aggregate uncertainty
and nominal bonds, optimal monetary policy attains the ex-ante Pareto optimal allocation. This
policy aims to stabilize the savings rate in the economy via the effect of expected inﬂation on real
returns of nominal bonds. The equilibrium under optimal monetary policy is characterized by
positive average inﬂation and a nonstationary price level. In an application a key ﬁnding is that
optimal monetary policy combines features of inﬂation and price-level targeting.
JEL classiﬁcation: E5
Bank classiﬁcation: Monetary policy framework
Résumé
Les auteurs analysent le rôle de la politique monétaire en présence de risques globaux et de
marchés incomplets. Dans un modèle à générations imbriquées où chaque agent vit deux périodes
et qui intègre une incertitude globale ainsi que des obligations non indexées, la politique
monétaire optimale permet une affectation des ressources ex ante correspondant à un optimum de
Pareto. Les autorités monétaires cherchent à stabiliser le taux d’épargne des agents en tirant parti
de l’effet de l’inﬂation anticipée sur le rendement réel des obligations non indexées. Sous le
régime monétaire optimal, l’équilibre se caractérise par un taux d’inﬂation moyen positif et un
niveau des prix non stationnaire. Constat important, dans une situation appliquée, la politique
optimale réunit des éléments propres aussi bien à la poursuite de cibles d’inﬂation qu’à celle de
cibles de niveau des prix.
Classiﬁcation JEL : E5
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Cadre de la politique monétaire1. Introduction
What is the role of monetary policy in an environment with aggregate risk and incomplete
asset markets? We study a standard two-period overlapping-generations model (OLG) with
aggregate-endowment uncertainty and ¯nd that monetary policy can achieve the ex-ante
Pareto optimal allocation. The optimal monetary policy that implements the ¯rst-best allo-
cation stabilizes savings rates by a®ecting the expected real return on nominal bonds. It is
characterized by positive average in°ation, a positive correlation between expected in°ation
and income, an inverse relationship between the volatility of expected in°ation and income
persistence, and a nonstationary price level.
To understand the role of these properties of the optimal policy, it helps to ¯rst restate
the main ¯ndings of the literature on savings behavior under uncertainty.1 When faced with
uninsurable endowment risk and a constant rate of return on savings, risk averse individuals
smooth their consumption by varying their savings rates with income. When current income
is higher than expected future income, individuals save a larger fraction of income to move
part of the current \windfall" to the future. When current income is lower than expected
future income individuals save less, taking advantage of the anticipated increase in future
income. Furthermore, for precautionary reasons, on average, they save more than optimal
without uncertainty, or under complete asset markets. The responsiveness of the savings
rate to income °uctuations depends on the persistence of income disturbances. When in-
come °uctuations are long-lived, incentives to vary savings are weak, whereas when income
movements are transitory, incentives to vary savings are strong.
The intuition for the properties of optimal monetary policy is the following. The ¯rst-
best consumption allocation calls for a constant savings rate. With nominal bonds, monetary
policy a®ects savings via its e®ect on expected in°ation. Without positive trend in°ation, risk
averse individuals tend to save more than optimal for precautionary reasons. Positive average
in°ation serves as an optimal tax on savings, which discourages oversaving. Turning to the
second property of optimal policy, positive correlation between expected in°ation and income
implies that when income is high (low) the expected tax on savings is higher (lower) too.
This discourages individuals from varying savings rates to smooth consumption over time and
thereby stabilizes the savings rate. The third property is a consequence of the fact that with
higher income persistence individuals have less expected variation in income, and therefore
less incentive to vary their savings rates. As a result, optimal expected in°ation has to vary
1The papers on this topic are too numerous to be mentioned and fall into \income °uctuations problem"
and \permanent income hypothesis" research agendas.
1less to discourage consumption smoothing. In the limit, when the income process is random
walk, optimal expected in°ation is constant. This implies the inverse relationship between
volatility of expected in°ation and persistence of income. Finally, a nonstationary price level
is a result of optimal monetary policy being completely forward looking and optimal expected
in°ation being independent of the current or past price levels. It is important to stress that all
of these four properties are optimal responses to aggregate uncertainty. Without uncertainty,
the optimal expected in°ation is always zero, and the optimal price level is constant.
We apply our analysis of the unconstrained optimal monetary policy to policies that are
constrained by publicly observable variables, or \targets." Such constrained policies are often
preferred to the unconstrained ones due to the uncertainty about economic mechanisms in
the real economy, or uncertainty associated with data revisions. Another potential advan-
tage of using constrained policies is alleviation of the \in°ation bias" that stems from the
time-inconsistency problem faced by the monetary authority.2 We will focus on two particu-
lar targeting policies: in°ation targeting (IT) and price-level targeting (PT). Starting in the
1990s, several central banks announced in°ation targeting as their monetary policy frame-
work.3 More recently, price-level targeting has been proposed as an alternative to in°ation
targeting.4
The debate focuses on whether a policy that stabilizes the price-level (possibly around a
deterministic trend) is preferable to policies that stabilize the in°ation rate. Under in°ation
targeting, the monetary authority announces a desired level of annual in°ation and conducts
monetary policy in a way consistent with that objective.5 Due to shocks and an imperfect
degree of control over prices, the actual in°ation rate may deviate from the desired level.
For this reason, policies aiming at stabilizing the in°ation level do not necessarily imply a
stationary price level. Speci¯cally, to stabilize the level of in°ation, the monetary authority
does not have to react to past deviations from a predetermined price level. The price level may
drift arbitrarily far away from any predetermined path, as the deviations accumulate over
time. Conversely, to keep the price level close to the predetermined trend, the central bank
2See Walsh (1998) and Woodford (2003) for reviews of constrained monetary policy problems.
3Ball and Sheridan (2003) provide a list of central banks that adopted in°ation targeting, as well as timing
details and performance evaluations for this policy change.
4There has been a series of policy oriented papers that discuss price-level targeting as an alternative
to in°ation targeting. To name a few, Calstrom and Fuerst (2002), Dittmar, Gavin and Kydland (1999),
Dittmar and Gavin (2005), Vestin (2000), Gavin and Stockman (1991), Duguay (1994), Ortega and Rebei
(2006), Svensson (1999), Smets (2003), Yetman (2005).
5As the Bank of Canada states: "monetary policy needs to aim at the 2 per cent target midpoint over the
six to eight quarters that are required for monetary policy to have most of its e®ect. By consistently aiming
at 2 per cent for the 12-month rate of in°ation, monetary policy can enhance the predictability of average
in°ation over longer time horizons."
2must reverse deviations from the desired in°ation level. Hence, under in°ation targeting,
transient deviations of the price level are not o®set by the monetary authority and so the
price level is nonstationary. It is (trend-)stationary under price-level targeting, when the
price level, as opposed to the in°ation level, is controlled.
We analyze the welfare implications of IT and PT in our framework and ¯nd that the
welfare rankings of in°ation targeting and price level targeting depend crucially on the per-
sistence of income. If income is close to a random walk, in°ation targeting is close to the
optimal monetary policy, as IT implies stable expected in°ation. Conversely, if income °uc-
tuations are transitory, price-level targeting is close to the optimal monetary policy since
PT implies a positive correlation between expected in°ation and income. Speci¯cally, when
income is high, a low realized price level calls for higher expected in°ation in order to return
the price level back to the trend.
We summarize that the optimal monetary policy combines features inherent to in°a-
tion targeting (nonstationary price level) and price-level targeting (reversion of price-level
deviations). The balance of these features in the optimal monetary policy depends on the
persistence of aggregate income.
These results can be generalized to more complicated settings. In a natural extension
of the benchmark model, we add a productive real asset, land, to the economy. Land is
combined with the labor endowment of young individuals to produce consumption goods.
The young are required to buy land for money before they can produce. They borrow money
from the old individuals via noncontingent nominal bonds. These nominal bonds dominate
money in terms of the rate of return and can be interpreted as mortgage contracts. In
this richer model the same qualitative results are obtained for optimal and simple targeting
regimes of monetary policy. Thus, our results are robust to the introduction of extra assets.
The paper contributes to several areas of research in monetary economics. To our knowl-
edge, this is the ¯rst paper to analyze monetary policy in a stochastic OLG environment.
Perhaps surprisingly, previous research on monetary policy in OLG models focused exclu-
sively on deterministic models. Suboptimality of positive in°ation was one of the main
¯ndings of that literature.6 In a recent paper, Akyol (2004) also ¯nds positive optimal
in°ation in an environment with in¯nitely lived agents, who are subject to uninsurable id-
iosyncratic endowment risk and borrowing constraints. With no aggregate uncertainty, the
price level in Akyol's model increases over time in a deterministic fashion. In our model,
6See, for example, Wallace (1992) or Champ and Freeman (2001).
3we provide a full characterization of optimal monetary policy under aggregate uncertainty.
The aggregate shocks create a rich environment for monetary policy analysis. Finally, our
paper contributes to the debate on the merits of price level stabilization. It shows that it is
optimal to only partially o®set transient shocks to the price level. Hence, the optimal policy
combines some features of both in°ation targeting (implying nonstationary price level) and
price-level targeting (reverting price-level deviations from the trend).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces and analyzes the model with ¯at
money as the only asset. Section 3 extends this model to include productive land as well as
an additional interest bearing asset, and shows that the qualitative results do not change.
Section 4 contains concluding remarks. Proofs and derivations are collected in the appendices.
2. An OLG Model With Fiat Money Only
In this section, we focus on a two-period overlapping-generations endowment economy in
which ¯at money is the only asset. The young individuals in this economy use money to save
for the time when they are old. Monetary policy a®ects real returns on savings via its e®ect
on expected in°ation. Given asset market incompleteness, monetary policy has the potential
to improve the average welfare in the economy.7
2.1 The Environment
There is a unit measure of identical individuals born in every period. Each generation lives
for two periods. The young person born in period t is endowed with wt units of a perishable
consumption good in period t and zero units in period t + 1. The endowment wt is random
and represents the only source of uncertainty in the model. The log of the endowment follows
a ¯rst-order autoregressive process:
lnwt = ½lnwt¡1 + "t ;
where "t are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) draws from a zero-mean normal
distribution:
The single asset in the economy is ¯at money supplied by the government. In period 1
7Markets are incomplete for two reasons. First, the overlapping-generations structure implies that newborn
individuals cannot insure against the endowment risk. Second, young individuals, who save in the form of a
noncontingent asset, cannot fully insure agains endowment risk when old.
4there is an initial old generation that has no endowment and holds M1 units of the money
stock.8
The timing of events is as follows. At the beginning of period t the old generation holds
Mt¡1 units of ¯at money which they acquired in the previous period. Before the current
endowment wt is realized, the government prints (or destroys) money in the amount of
Mt ¡ Mt¡1; and distributes it evenly among the old individuals via lump-sum transfer (or
tax if negative) Tt = Mt ¡ Mt¡1: The assumption that monetary transfers occur before the
realization of the current endowment, re°ects the limited ability of the government policy to
react to current shocks in the economy, and implies an incomplete degree of control over the
price level. After the realization of the current endowment, wt, the young agents consume
c
y
t units of their endowment. The remaining goods, (wt ¡c
y
t); are exchanged for Md
t units of
















t + Tt+1 ;
where co
t+1 is the person's consumption when old, Tt is the monetary transfer from the
government in period t, and ¯ is the discount factor. The operator Et denotes the expected
value conditional on the history of endowment realizations through the end of period t.
Throughout the paper we use the following functional form for the period utility function:
u(c) = c1¡°=(1 ¡ °); ° > 0.
2.2 Monetary Equilibrium
Let ¹t denote the growth of money supply in the economy in period t, ¹t = Mt
Mt¡1, where ¹1
is ¯xed at 1 without a loss of generality. Monetary policy is de¯ned as an in¯nite sequence
of money growth rates, f¹tg
1
t=1.
8In this model M can be thought of as the sum of two equivalent assets: ¯at money and discount bonds.
The fact that nominal interest rate on bonds is ¯xed at zero does not a®ect our results. We relax this
assumption in the model of section 3, where the nominal interest rate on bonds is endogeneous.
5De¯nition 1 Given a monetary policy f¹tg
1
t=1 ; a monetary equilibrium for this economy is















t solve the generation t's problem (1), and





t = wt ;
M
d
t = Mt :
In the next two subsections we ¯rst characterizes the optimal allocation and the opti-
mal monetary policy that implements it as a monetary equilibrium, and second, compare
social welfare in equilibria with price-level and in°ation targeting to that under the optimal
monetary policy.
2.3 Optimal Monetary Policy
To ¯nd the optimal monetary policy, we start by de¯ning the social welfare function and
solving the social planner's problem for the optimal allocation. We then ask whether this
allocation can be implemented as a monetary equilibrium.
2.3.1 The Social Planner's Problem
The social planner is assumed to treat all generations equally. Let the average (ex-post)

































We de¯ne the social welfare function as
lim
T!1
inf E [VT] : (4)
9All of the variables in the de¯nition are random variables conditional on histories of endowment realiza-
tions. We suppress the "state" notation for simplicity.
6This welfare criterion treats all generations equally by attaching the same welfare weight to
the expected utility of every generation.





t · wt; for t = 1;2;::: :


















t = wt :
For the case of a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) period utility function, u(c) =
c1¡°



















for all t = 1;2;::: .





















First, the consumption allocation (5) and (6) implied by the undiscounted welfare function,
maximizes the unconditional expected utility of any given generation (except the initial old).
Hence, it is the unique ex-ante optimal allocation. Second, without endowment uncertainty,
this allocation is implementable as a market equilibrium with a constant money stock. This
implies that the amount of redistribution of endowment required to achieve the optimal
allocation is minimal. In contrast, under the discounted social welfare function redistribution
is large, even when there is no uncertainty.
72.3.2 Implementing the Optimal Allocation as a Monetary Equilibrium
Suppose the ¯rst-best allocation can be implemented in a monetary equilibrium. Any mon-
























































Given the assumption of log normality of the endowment process, equations (9) and (10)
imply
mt+1 ¡ mt =
(1 ¡ °)2¾2
2
+ (1 ¡ ½)(° ¡ 1)!t; (11)
pt+1 ¡ pt =
(1 ¡ °)2¾2
2
+ °(1 ¡ ½)!t ¡ "t+1 ; (12)
where mt ´ lnMt, pt ´ lnPt, !t ´ lnwt and ¾ is the standard deviation of innovations to
the endowment process.
Equations (11) and (12) fully characterize the dynamics of the money stock and price
level in equilibrium that implements the optimal consumption allocation. We summarize
four main properties of price level dynamics under the optimal monetary policy:
(i) The average in°ation under the optimal policy is positive, ¹ ¼ =
(1¡°)2¾2
2 , and increasing
with the size of uncertainty, as long as ° 6= 1.10





> 1, and holds for any stationary distribution of endowment,
and also for the case of random walk (with no drift).
8(ii) Expected in°ation is positively correlated with the current endowment:
Et [pt+1 ¡ pt] = ¹ ¼ + °(1 ¡ ½)!t: (13)
(iii) The variance of expected in°ation is decreasing in the persistence of the endowment
process, ½. If the endowment follows a random walk, ½ = 1, then optimal expected
in°ation is constant: Et [pt+1 ¡ pt] = ¹ ¼.
(iv) The log price level under the optimal policy is nonstationary.11
To understand these properties of the optimal policy, recall from equations (5) and (6)






° . In a monetary
equilibrium, the savings rate depends on the expected return to money Et [pt ¡ pt+1], which
is the negative of the expected in°ation. The monetary authority sets expected in°ation,
by appropriately choosing the rate of money growth, to stabilize the equilibrium savings
rate at the optimal level. The ¯rst three properties of the optimal monetary policy describe
how expected in°ation must be set to achieve the ¯rst-best allocation. The last property, a
nonstationary price level, is an outcome of the optimal monetary policy.
Property 1 is due to asset market incompleteness, implying that individuals cannot per-
fectly insure themselves against endowment risk. In the face of uncertainty about future
income, risk-averse individuals have an incentive to self-insure by smoothing consumption
across time. Without positive trend in°ation, they tend to save more than optimal for
precautionary reasons, as in Aiyagari (1994). Positive average in°ation serves as a tax on
savings, which discourages oversaving.
According to Property 2, a positive correlation between the expected in°ation and income
implies a high (low) expected tax on savings when income is high (low). This discourages
individuals from varying savings rates to smooth consumption over time and thereby stabilizes
the savings rate.
11To show this we have to consider two cases: ½ < 1 and ½ = 1: First, assume ½ < 1: Suppose the money
stock mt is a stationary time series. Then it must be that var(mt+1) = var(mt): Equation (11) then implies:
0 = (1 ¡ ½)2(° ¡ 1)2 ¾
2
1¡½2 + 2cov(mt;(1 ¡ ½)(° ¡ 1)!t). Expanding mt and !t; it is easy to see that the
covariance term on the right-hand side is non-negative, leading to a contradiction. Thus, the money stock
mt cannot be stationary. Further, since pt = mt ¡ logxt; and since xt 2 [0;wt] is stationary, the log of the
price level must also be nonstationary.
If ½ = 1; then optimal xt is nonstationary, while optimal mt is stationary. This implies again that the log
of the price level must be nonstationary.
9Property 3 implies that with higher income persistence individuals expect less variation
in income, and therefore, they have less incentive to vary their savings rate. As a result,
the optimal expected in°ation has to vary less to discourage consumption smoothing. In the
limit, when income follows a random walk, the optimal expected in°ation is constant.
Finally, Property 4, a nonstationary price level, is the result of optimal expected in°ation
being independent of current and past price levels, i.e., optimal monetary policy being com-
pletely forward-looking. Under the optimal policy, it is expected in°ation that matters for
savings rates, and not the price level. Also note that without uncertainty, optimal expected
in°ation is always zero, and the optimal price level is constant. Hence, this paper emphasizes
the role of monetary policy in a®ecting the savings behavior of risk-averse individuals under
uncertainty and market incompleteness.
In Section 2.4, we demonstrate that the welfare ranking of other monetary policy regimes
depends on how well they can approximate the four properties of optimal monetary policy.
The persistence of the income shock is crucial in determining which properties are important.
2.4 Evaluating Targeting Regimes
In the previous section, we derived the unrestricted optimal monetary policy. The government
knows preferences of individuals, observes realized shocks, and fully commits to the optimal
policy. In reality, such an optimal policy is hard to implement because of fundamental
uncertainty about the structure of the economy. Moreover, it was shown by Kydland and
Prescott (1977), that the monetary authority may su®er from a time-inconsistency problem.
For example, the high in°ation episodes of the 1970s and the subsequent recessions of the
1980s are often blamed on monetary policy mistakes and on in°ationary bias due to wrong
incentives of policymakers. As a result, unrestricted monetary policy was widely perceived to
be inferior to monetary policy regimes that target some publicly observable nominal variables
(e.g., money growth rates, the exchange rate or the in°ation rate). So, the attention of
monetary policy theorists shifted from unrestricted optimal policies to those constrained by
observable economic variables. Such policies often take the form of targeting rules, whereby
a policy control variable (e.g., a nominal interest rate) is used to o®set deviations of the
in°ation rate or the output gap from their desired levels. The focus of monetary-policy
research has been on ¯nding the optimal targeting rule that the monetary authority should
follow, or alternatively, on ¯nding the objective that should be \delegated" to the monetary
authority.
10In this section, we analyze a class of targeting rules that de¯ne monetary policy via its
e®ect on the expected path of the price level: in°ation targeting and price-level targeting.
As equations (11) and (12) show, due to the timing restriction, monetary policy cannot fully
control the price level, and so innovations to endowments act as shocks to the price level.
Hence, both policy regimes target only the expected level of in°ation or the price level,
and allow deviations from the respective targets due to unexpected price shocks. In this
subsection, we ¯rst introduce a parametrized class of constrained monetary policies that nest
IT and PT. Next, we characterize the equilibrium in the overlapping-generations economy
under the imposed constraint on monetary policy. Finally, we compare dynamics and welfare
under IT and PT to those under the unrestricted optimal policy.
Suppose that the government sets the money growth rate so that in equilibrium the
expected price level evolves according to the following dynamic equation
Et [pt+1 ¡ zt+1] = ¸(pt ¡ zt) (14)
where, zt = p1+¹ ¼t, is a deterministic trend of the log price level and ¹ ¼ is the average in°ation
rate. Since we focus on the dynamic properties of equilibria under policy rule (14), we assume
that the average in°ation rate is at its optimal level, ¹ ¼ =
(1¡°)2¾2
2 .
The adjustment coe±cient, ¸ 2 [0;1], determines how fast the price level is expected to
return to the trend under targeting rule (14). In particular, ¸ = 0 corresponds to strict
price level targeting, ¸ = 1 corresponds to strict in°ation targeting, while any ¸ 2 (0;1)
correspond to gradual price level targeting where deviations from the trend are reversed
more slowly than under strict price level targeting.12 In general, the restricted set of simple
targeting rules (14) does not nest the (unrestricted) optimal monetary policy. Thus, the
welfare attained under any monetary policy in the restricted class (14) will be less than that
under the optimal monetary policy. We do not have a proof of the uniqueness of constrained
policy rules. However, in computational experiments with di®erent initial values, it appears
that for each value of ¸ there is a unique monetary policy that satis¯es (14).
Appendix C shows that targeting policy rules (14) are equivalent to a monetary author-
ity choosing the price level path that minimizes the \loss function" delegated to it by the
12We also consider an alternative class of monetary policy regimes: Et [pt+1 ¡ pt] = (1¡Á)¼+Á(pt ¡ pt¡1);
where Á 2 [0;1]: For Á > 0, this regime corresponds to gradual in°ation targeting, whereby deviations of
in°ation from ¼ are gradually eliminated. It turns out that strict in°ation targeting (Á = 0) welfare dominates
gradual in°ation targeting (Á > 0). Hence, we can focus our analysis on strict in°ation targeting rules only.















then the monetary authority follows the strict price-level targeting given by (14) with ¸ = 0.
In our model, we focus entirely on the saving decision and do not explicitly model labor-
leisure or capital investment decisions. As a result, there is no in°ation-output tradeo®, and
thus no output gap term in any of the loss functions. Incorporating the labor-leisure and
capital investment decisions in our framework is an interesting extension.




Pt ; and ht = Mt exp(¡zt): We can rewrite the ¯rst-order conditions (7) and (8)
as


















exp(¡¹ ¼) : (15)








Thus, to solve for a monetary equilibrium, we need to ¯nd sequences fxt;htg that satisfy the




















The state of the economy in period t can be fully summarized by st = (!t;ht). To solve
the system (17) and (18), we ¯nd functions xt = x(!t;ht) and ht+1 = h(!t;ht) that satisfy
12the two dynamic equations.
2.4.2 Welfare Comparisons of Targeting Regimes
What constrained policy (parametrized by ¸) in the class of targeting regimes (14) maximizes
the unconditional expected utility attained in a stationary equilibrium? It is instructive to
¯rst consider the log utility case (° = 1). For this special case it is easy to verify from equa-
tions (17) and (18) that the policy (14) that implements the ¯rst-best allocation corresponds
to ¸ = ½. Indeed, expected in°ation under the optimal policy satis¯es (13), which for this
special case can be written as
Et [pt+1 ¡ pt] = °(1 ¡ ¸
¤)!t :
Hence, in the log utility case the targeting regime (14) with ¸¤ = ½ attains the ¯rst-best
allocation. It implies a constant money stock (see equation (11)), zero average in°ation, and
a stationary price level.
For ° 6= 1; there is also a special case for which an analytical solution exists. If the
endowment process follows a random walk, ½ = 1, then the unrestricted optimal monetary
policy is consistent with the restricted policy rule (14) at ¸¤ = ½ = 1. In this case, the
expected in°ation is constant




and so in°ation targeting attains the ¯rst-best allocation.
For other values of risk-aversion, °, and income persistence, ½, the welfare comparisons
have to be done numerically. Welfare across equilibria are compared to the welfare in equi-

















To calculate welfare under targeting rule (14), we simulate the economy over 10,000 pe-







t)]. We compare the value of the average utility, VT; with EV ¤ by cal-
culating the percentage by which consumption of every individual in every period has to be
raised to reach the same level of welfare as under the optimal allocation. Speci¯cally, let ±





















We report welfare loss as the net lifetime-consumption-equivalent compensation, Comp:% =
(± ¡ 1) ¤ 100%:
Experimenting with various sets of parameters, we ¯nd that the discount rate, ¯, and the
coe±cient of relative risk aversion, °, have little e®ect on the magnitude of welfare losses and
on the relative welfare rankings. We pick standard values of these two parameters, ¯ = 0:9630
and ° = 1:5 (see Table 1). The standard deviation of innovations to the endowment, ¾, a®ects
the level, but not the order, of welfare losses under alternative targeting rules (14). Smaller
values of ¾ imply smaller welfare di®erences between various policies. In particular, with no
uncertainty, ¾ = 0, all policies (14) imply the same welfare loss. We set ¾ = 0:08:13 As we
noted earlier, income persistence, ½, is crucial for welfare rankings of the alternative policy
regimes, as well as for the magnitude of the welfare loss. For that reason, we report welfare
losses for a range of values of income persistence.
Table 1: Parameter values for model simulations
Parameter Values
Discount factor, ¯ 0:9630
Relative risk aversion, ° 1:5
Standard deviation of innovations to endowment, ¾ 0:08
Persistence of the endowment process, ½ 0:1; 0:5; 0:9
Figure 1 presents the welfare losses across equilibria with various values of ¸. We repeat
the experiment for three di®erent values of the serial correlation of the endowment process:
½ = 0:1, 0:5 and 0:9, keeping other parameters ¯xed. The welfare loss is U-shaped, with the
minimum located close, but to the left of ¸ = ½: At the minimum, the welfare loss is very
small, less than 0.02% of consumption, so the best policy in the class of targeting regimes
(14) is nearly optimal. For other policy rules in the restricted class, welfare losses grow faster
as persistence of income decreases. In particular, this implies that under strict in°ation
targeting, welfare losses are disproportionately higher than under strict price-level targeting.
13Our estimates of ¾ from GDP data for U.S. and U.K. range from 0.02 to 0.16 depending on how we
detrend the data, and what we assume about the stationarity of the income process. We choose a value in
the middle of this range.
14For example, if ½ = 0:1, the welfare loss under the strict IT is 0.62%, whereas if ½ = 0:9, the
welfare loss due to following the strict PT is much smaller, 0.08%.
Why does the best restricted policy regime correspond to the transition coe±cient, ¸,
being close to the persistence of endowment, ½? As was demonstrated before, monetary policy
provides high average welfare if it is able to stabilize the savings rate at the optimal level. In
the model, the monetary authority controls the expected return on ¯at money, Et [pt ¡ pt+1];
or equivalently, the expected in°ation rate, Et¼t+1 = Et [pt+1 ¡ pt]. So monetary policy yields








= ¼ + °(1 ¡ ½)!t : (19)
In the special case of log utility, ° = 1, and ¸ = ½, the equilibrium expected in°ation is given
by
Et [¼t+1] = ¼ + °(1 ¡ ¸)!t : (20)
For risk aversion other than 1, if ¸ ¼ ½; the equilibrium expected in°ation is approximately
Et [¼t+1] ¼ ¼ + °(1 ¡ ¸)!t: (21)
From (19) and (21) it follows that for ¸ close to ½, the path of expected in°ation under
targeting rule (14) is going to be close to the optimal expected in°ation. This has simple
policy implications for the targeting horizon: deviations of the price level from trend should
be as persistent as income °uctuations.
We conclude that strict IT is closer to the (unrestricted) optimum if income °uctuations
are highly persistent; and strict PT is closer to the optimum if income °uctuations are
transitory. To understand the intuition behind this result, we examine how well each of the
policy regimes replicates the four properties of the optimal monetary policy, discussed in
Section 2.3.2.
First, we assume that IT and PT have the same trend in°ation, ¼, as the optimal policy,
which allows us to focus on welfare di®erences due to the dynamic e®ects of monetary policy
on savings under uncertainty. This assumption implies that without uncertainty, IT and PT
would be equivalent not only to each other, but also to the optimal policy.
When aggregate uncertainty is present, income persistence is crucial for shaping the dy-
namic properties of monetary policy (Properties 2 and 3 in Section 2.3.2). If income follows
15a random walk, ½ = 1, optimal monetary policy requires constant expected in°ation, which
corresponds to in°ation targeting. Thus, when the income process is highly persistent, strict
IT is close to the optimum in terms of expected in°ation dynamics, while strict PT im-
plies too much variation in expected in°ation. On the other hand, if income °uctuations
are transitory, the optimal monetary policy requires a positive correlation between expected
in°ation and income, which is consistent with price-level targeting. Indeed, when income is
high, a low realized price level calls for higher expected in°ation to return the price level
back to trend. Conversely, under in°ation targeting, expected in°ation is constant, hence its
correlation with income is zero. Thus, when income persistence is low, strict PT is nearly
optimal in terms of in°ation dynamics, while strict IT implies too little variation in expected
in°ation.
The last property of the optimal policy is a nonstationary price level. In°ation targeting
satis¯es that property, while price-level targeting does not. Hence, optimal monetary policy
combines elements of both price-level and in°ation targeting: it reverts temporary deviations
of the price level from the trend, but does not return the price level all the way back to the
trend, as price-level targeting would prescribe. As we learned from model simulations, income
persistence is key for the balance between these two features of the optimal policy. Depending
on the persistence of income, the implied price level dynamics are mimicked better by either
a strict price-level targeting or strict in°ation targeting policy regime.
Regrettably, there is no conclusive empirical evidence on the persistence of aggregate
income. The empirical literature is mostly debating whether income is a trend-stationary
variable or a nonstationary variable with drift. Campbell and Mankiw (1987) examine the
persistence of U.S. real GNP by looking at the long-run impulse response in an estimated
ARIMA model and conclude that shocks to GNP are largely permanent. However, they
caution that it appears impossible to reject the view that output reverts to the trend after
twenty years.
Cochrane (1988) questions those ¯ndings using a non-parametric variance test. He ¯nds
little persistence in real U.S. GNP, and asserts that conventional methods of estimating
persistence are misleading, because they are trying to estimate a long-run impulse response
from short-run dynamics. He concludes that the existence or size of a random walk component
in GNP is not a precisely measured \stylized fact" that any reasonable model must reproduce,
but warns that standard errors are large. Cochrane concludes that this result is unavoidable,
since one needs long-run data to estimate long-run persistence of income, but there are
inherently few nonoverlapping long runs available.
16Perron (1989) also examines the persistence of U.S. GNP using the same dataset as
Campbell and Mankiw (1987), and ¯nds that traditional unit root tests cannot reject a unit
root hypothesis if the true process is stationary around a trend which contains a one-time
break. He develops a test which allows for a one time break in trend and ¯nds that °uctuations
are stationary around a deterministic trend function. The only shocks that had persistent
e®ects are the 1929 crash and the 1973 oil price shock. Perron also cautions that the rejection
of the unit root is conditional on treating one-time breaks in trend as exogenous events that
are not part of the data-generating process. He further notes that even if these breaks are
indeed part of the data-generating process, apparently they arrive extremely rarely.
Finally, Serletis (1992) replicates Perron's test using Canadian 1870-1985 real GNP and
concludes that the unit root hypothesis could be rejected if allowance is made for the possi-
bility of a one-time break of the trend function during the Great Depression.
Given these somewhat inconclusive results, we choose to report our ¯ndings for a range
of values of the persistence parameter, ½. The main ¯nding of this section is theoretical. In a
two-period overlapping-generations model with aggregate uncertainty, noncontingent nominal
assets, and trend-stationary income, strict price-level targeting dominates strict in°ation
targeting and is close to the optimal policy in welfare terms. If income is nonstationary, then
in°ation targeting dominates price-level targeting and is close to the optimal policy. Given
that the evidence of a unit root in aggregate income is rather weak, our results suggest that
targeting rules that put signi¯cant weight on reverting temporary price-level deviations from
the trend are likely to do better.
Overall, our results and intuition for optimal policy and targeting rules come from the
analysis of savings decisions under uncertainty. Even though the benchmark model imposes
strong assumptions about the structure of asset markets, the main ¯ndings can be gener-
alized to more realistic environments. In particular, in the benchmark model there are no
alternative assets except ¯at money, and the nominal return on money is ¯xed (at unity).
Under these assumptions, changes in expected in°ation translate one for one into changes in
real interest rates. If the economy had alternative assets in addition to money, with endoge-
nously determined rates of return, then changes in in°ation could have smaller e®ects on real
interest rates. In the next section, we present a richer model in which there are two assets
besides money, and rates of return are determined endogenously. We ¯nd that our results
for optimal policy and for targeting rules (14) apply with little change.
173. An OLG Economy With Land, Nominal Bonds and
Money
In order to keep things tractable, the model in the previous section has the strong assumption
that there are no alternative assets, except ¯at money. In this section, we present a richer
model, in which there is productive land and nominal bonds in addition to money. Nominal
bonds are di®erent from money, and dominate it in the rate of return. We generate demand
for money by assuming that young agents have to use money to buy land. The young borrow
money from the old by issuing noncontingent nominal bonds. We assume that the trade of
bonds and the purchase of land take place before the realization of the current productivity
shock. One can think of these arrangements as mortgage contracts. The young take a
mortgage, buy land, learn their productivity shock, produce, and then repay the bonds. The
assumption of money being necessary to buy land, can be motivated by some underlying
credit market intermediation technology, in which money serves as a medium of exchange.
In this section, we ¯rst present the environment and characterize the monetary equilibrium.
Then, we derive the optimal monetary policy which implements the ¯rst-best allocation,
using the same welfare criterion as before. Finally, we will apply the model to compare
welfare implications of PT and IT monetary policy regimes. Derivations will be relegated to
the appendix. Despite the model being richer and more complex than the previous one, the
results and intuition remain essentially unchanged.
3.1 The Environment
There is a unit measure of agents born every period. All individuals of the same generation
are identical in all respects. Every generation lives for two periods. Further, each period
is subdivided into two subperiods: morning and afternoon. In the morning of period t; the
current productivity shock At has not been observed yet. The young generation has nothing
except the endowment of labor. The old own the entire stock of land L plus the entire stock
of money Mt¡1. The government prints (destroys) new money in the amount Mt¡Mt¡1; and
allocates it equally among the old with a lump-sum transfer (tax). The young borrow some
amount of money from the old to ¯nance their land purchases. The old lend money and then
sell their land for money. The morning subperiod ends.
In the afternoon of period t the productivity shock At is realized. The young combine their
labor endowment (N = 1) and the purchased land in a Cobb-Douglas production function
to produce output, Yt = AtL®N1¡® = AtL®. They consume part of their output c
y
t; and use
18the remainder to retire their debt and to purchase money Md
t for the next period, when they
will be old. The evening subperiod ends.
We assume that the log of the productivity shock, at = lnAt, follows a ¯rst-order autore-
gressive process:
at = ½at¡1 + "t ;
where "t is distributed as N(0;¾2). It is the only source of uncertainty in the model. In
this section it is important to keep track of the timing of various events. For this reason we
introduce state space notation and show the timing of events in the ¯gure 3. We will use st
to represent the history of the economy up to period t; and st to represent the current state
of the economy. The history evolves as st+1 = (st;st+1):Observe that with this notation,
M(st¡1) represents Mt, since we assume that Mt is determined in the morning of period t;
that is, before At = A(st) is realized.














subject to the following constraints:








where q(st¡1) is the morning nominal price of land, d(st¡1) is the discount factor on
money borrowed in the morning, and Bd(st¡1) is the nominal value of goods to be
returned to the old in the afternoon for repayment of debt.





































where T(st) = M(st) ¡ M(st¡1):













It remains to specify a monetary policy to complete the description of the model. Again,
we will start from the optimal monetary policy.
3.2 Optimal Monetary Policy
We maintain the same social welfare criterion as in Section 2.3.1. In Appendix E we solve the
social planner's problem for the ¯rst-best allocations and then derive the optimal monetary












+ °(1 ¡ ½)at ¡ "t+1:
Observe that, except for the ¯rst term on the right hand side, this is exactly the same formula
as in the money only economy. The discount rate d(st) is a constant in three special cases:
¯rst, when shocks to productivity are i.i.d. (½ = 0), second, when shocks to productivity
follow a random walk (½ = 1), and third, when utility is logarithmic (° = 1). Outside of
these special cases, the discount rate does vary with productivity, but °uctuations are small.
Thus, we can state essentially the same results as in the money only economy:










(ii) Expected in°ation is positively correlated with current income








+ °(1 ¡ ½)at:
14Note that that ¼ is not the same as before, but it is still the optimal long-run in°ation.
20(iii) The variability of expected in°ation is decreasing in persistence of the endowment
process, ½. In particular, when ½ = 1, the optimal expected in°ation is constant:
Et [pt+1 ¡ pt] = ¼:
(iv) The optimal price level is nonstationary.
Let us now see if our results for PT/IT monetary policy regimes also carry over to this
model.
3.3 In°ation Targeting and Price Level Targeting Policy Regimes
As in the money only economy, we apply the model to compare welfare in monetary equilibria
with in°ation and price level targeting policy rules. As before, we refer to these constrained
monetary policies as targeting rules. In Appendix D we show how to solve the model and
outline the computation procedure.
What constant value of ¸ maximizes the unconditional expected utility
E [u(cy (s)) + ¯u(co(s0))]; attained in a monetary equilibrium? There are again the
same special cases, for which we can solve the model analytically. We ¯rst look at the log
utility case (° = 1). For this special case it is easy to (guess and) verify from the ¯rst-order
optimality conditions (see equations (D10) - (D12) in Appendix D) that the optimal policy
implementing the ¯rst-best allocation is consistent with (14) if ¸ = ½.
Similarly, if the endowment process is a random walk, ½ = 1, then (14) with ¸ = ½ = 1 is
consistent with the optimal policy implementing the ¯rst-best allocations.
For other values of parameters we have to resort to simulations. We also need to choose
parameters. The model is homogeneous in L; so without loss of generality, we can normalize
it to unity15. The advantage of doing this is that income is now equal to productivity At:
As a result we can use the same parameters for the stochastic process of productivity, as
the ones for the endowment in the money only economy. Therefore, we use the same set of
parameters as before, except for one additional parameter, the income share of land. The
income share of land, ®, in the production function is taken as the share of structures in
GDP reported in Krussel et al. (2000). Table 2 lists all the parameters.
15Consumption equivalent welfare losses are independent of L:
21Table 2: Parameter values for model simulations, land economy
Parameter Values
Discount factor, ¯ 0:9630
Relative risk aversion, ° 1:5
Standard deviation of innovations to endowment, ¾ 0:08
Persistence of endowment process, ½ 0:1; 0:5; 0:9
Income share of land, ® 0:12
We simulate the economy with di®erent values of ¸ over many periods, and for each







t)]. We compare the value of the average utility, VT; with the maxi-






































as in the money only model. As a welfare metric, we use the same consumption equivalent
compensation measure as before. Results of these simulations are presented in Figure 2
which presents welfare losses across equilibria with various values of ¸. As is evident from
Figure 2, results are very similar to those from the money only economy: income persistence
determines whether PT or IT is closer to the optimum, and the best targeting regime has
¸ ¼ ½. Thus our results transfer with almost no change to this richer environment with
additional assets.
4. Conclusion
We explore the role of monetary policy in the environment with aggregate risk, incomplete
markets and long-term nominal bonds. In a two-period overlapping-generations model with
aggregate uncertainty and nominal bonds, optimal monetary policy attains the ex-ante Pareto
22optimal allocation. This policy is characterized by positive average in°ation, a positive
correlation between expected in°ation and income, an inverse relationship between volatility
of expected in°ation and persistence of income, and a nonstationary price level. The model
sheds light on the debate over the advantages of price level targeting regimes relative to
in°ation targeting regimes. Persistence of income is key. If the income process is a random
walk, in°ation targeting is the optimal monetary policy, while price-level targeting is not.
When income persistence is low price-level targeting dominates in°ation targeting and is
close to the ¯rst best monetary policy in welfare terms.
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Figure 1: Parameters ¯ = 0:9630;¸ = 1:5;¾ = 0:08
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Figure 3: Timing of events in the model with land
28Appendix A: The Solution To the Social Planner's
Problem








t · wt; for all t = 1;2;:::;T: (A1)


















It is a pair of consumption functions c
y
t = cy¤(wt); and co
t = co¤(wt): Given wt, they are

















t=1 be any other sequence of consumptions that satis¯es (A1) in each period t;
and let VT be the corresponding average ex-post utility as de¯ned in (3). Then V ¤
T ¸ VT;








Taking expectation of V ¤
T ¡ VT with respect to realizations of wT we have:
E [V
¤
T ] ¡ E [VT] ¸ 0:





T ] ¡ E [VT]) ¸ 0:





t=1 was arbitrary, the stationary policy cy¤(w);co¤(w) attains the
maximum of the expected average utility, E [VT], for all T:
29Appendix B: Derivation of Equation (16)
Let xt = Mt










Let us rewrite equation (B1) in log terms
pt ¡ pt+1 = mt ¡ mt+1 + lnxt+1 ¡ lnxt: (B2)
We concentrate on PT(¸) monetary policy rules that satisfy the dynamic equation
pt ¡ zt = ¸(pt¡1 ¡ zt¡1) ¡ vt; (B3)
where vt is a zero-mean, serially-uncorrelated stochastic process, that is orthogonal to the
information set available at the end of period t.
We ¯rst need to ¯nd the money supply rule that will be consistent with (B3). Equation
(B3) implies
pt ¡ pt+1 = ¸(pt¡1 ¡ pt) ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)¹ ¼ ¡ vt + vt+1: (B4)
Let »t = lnxt: From equations (B3) and (B4) it follows that the monetary policy rule that is
consistent with (14) must satisfy:
mt+1 ¡ mt = ¸(pt ¡ pt¡1) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹ ¼ + »t+1 ¡ »t + vt ¡ vt+1:
Taking conditional expectation Et on both sides, we obtain the money supply rule:
mt+1 ¡ mt = ¸(pt ¡ pt¡1) + (1 ¡ ¸)¹ ¼ + Et [»t+1] ¡ »t + vt; (B5)
which implies that vt+1 = »t+1¡Et [»t+1], and Et [vt+1] = 0: Thus, vt+1 is indeed an innovation,
and is, therefore, orthogonal to all the variables known as of period t:
Et [­tvt+1] = ­tEt [vt+1] = 0:
Further, since E(vtvt+1) = E [Et(vtvt+1)] by the law of iterated expectations, and since
Et(vtvt+1) = vtEt(vt+1) = 0; it follows that E(vtvt+1) = 0: Therefore, the error process
vt is serially uncorrelated. Thus, the government must change the money supply according
30to (B5) to guarantee that the price level follows the dynamic equation (B3) in each period.






































Denoting ht = Mt







31Appendix C: Equivalence of Loss Functions and Strict
Targeting Rules







where · is an arbitrary constant in (0;1); subject to f¼tg1
t=1 being consistent with a monetary
equilibrium. The constraint says that in choosing its monetary policy, the monetary authority
must to respect the ¯rst-order conditions of individuals. Ignoring the constraint for a moment,







Due to our timing assumption, the monetary authority has control of next period's expected






t(Et¡1¼t + vt ¡ ¼)
2; (C2)
where vt is the part of in°ation in period t that is not under the control of the monetary
authority. The ¯rst order condition of the unconstrained problem is
2·
tEt¡1(Et¡1¼t + vt ¡ ¼) = 0;
or equivalently,
Et¡1 (¼t ¡ ¼) = 0:
If the monetary authority sets Et¡1¼t = ¼ every period, then the ¯rst order conditions of the
unconstrained problem are satis¯ed. Under strict IT, the monetary authority is required to
have Et¡1¼t = ¼: In any monetary equilibrium with this constraint imposed, the ¯rst order
conditions of individuals hold as well. It follows then, that any strict IT regime monetary
equilibrium, satis¯es the necessary and su±cient conditions of the constrained problem with
the loss function given by (C1).
To show the converse, suppose there is a solution of the constrained problem with the
loss function (C1) such that Et¡1¼t 6= ¼ in at least one period with positive probability. This
32means that the constraint set must be binding, and the value of the loss function must be
greater relative to the the unconstrained problem. This leads to a contradiction, because
any strict IT regime equilibrium minimizes the unconstrained loss function, and thus must
do better than our assumed solution. This proves the equivalence.
For the strict PT regime and the loss function L = E
P1
t=1 ·t(pt ¡ zt)2, the logic is
identical.
33Appendix D: Solving the Model With Land

















































































































































where »(st) ¸ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on constraint (D1).
From the last ¯rst-order condition it follows that d(st) · 1: It must be strictly less than
1 in equilibrium, and this implies that old agents will lend all of their money stock, while













Taking into account the equilibrium conditions (D5), we can rewrite the ¯rst order con-















































































































































































































































































: The money market clearing conditions imply the law of
































































36To close the system, we need to determine how
M(st¡1)
M(st) changes over time. Let h(st¡1) =
M(st¡1)

















We end up with a system of 2S + 1 dynamic equations (D10)-(D12) that must be solved to







































































), for all st: (D12)
where x(st) =
M(st¡1)
P(st) and h(st) =
M(st)
Zt+1 :
Suppose we know x(st+1), d(st): We can solve the above 2S + 1 equations for 2S + 1 un-
known functions: d(At¡1;h(st¡1)); x(At;At¡1;h(st¡1)); and h0(At;At¡1;h(st¡1)): Note that
in the case of i.i.d. productivity shocks these three functions do not depend on At¡1. This
is because the only way At¡1 enters the equations above, is through conditional probabil-
ities Pr(stjst¡1). With i.i.d. shocks those are independent of st¡1; and we are looking for
d(h(st¡1)); x(At;h(st¡1)); and h0(At;h(st¡1)).





































































), for all st:
38Appendix E: Optimal Monetary Policy in the Model
With Land





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Let us concentrate on stationary (¯rst-best) equilibria, i.e. let ª(st) = ª(st): The last
equation is a functional equation which determines ª(At): Once ª(At) is known, we can use






























+ °(1 ¡ ½)at ¡ "t+1:
It is easy to see from equation (E1) that the discount rate d(st) is a constant in three
special cases: ¯rst, when shocks to productivity are i.i.d. (½ = 0), second, when shocks to
productivity are a random walk (½ = 1), and third, when utility is logarithmic (° = 1). Let
us prove this for an i.i.d. case.



























































Since we are focusing on stationary equilibria, assume
M(st)
M(st¡1) = ¹(st) and d(st) = d(st): The
¯rst equation implies that d(st¡1) is independent of st¡1: Thus d(st) = d for all st and for all




°(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ®
¯
1
°(1 + ®) + ®
:
42